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This paper focuses on the notion of politeness formulae as an analytical 
category in linguistic politeness research. It argues that the current 
theories of linguistic politeness have neglected the notion of politeness 
formulae, either ignoring the relationship between their semantic, formal 
and pragmatic characteristics or disputing their existence altogether, 
claiming that the emergence of polite meanings is restricted to singular 
and concrete contexts. It will be shown, however, that a non-contextual 
approach to linguistic politeness makes it possible to describe politeness 
formulae systematically on a pragmatic, semantic, and even formal level. 
The approach is based on the common ground of all politeness 
phenomena, namely their function of establishing, maintaining or 
negotiating relations of social distance.  
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Introduction 
The title of the present article makes two assumptions which are far from 
being unquestioned in linguistic politeness theory: 1. There is such a 
thing as politeness formulae, i.e., recurring linguistic elements that are 
stereotypically associated with the communication of polite meanings. 2. 
Those formulae can – at least within a given language – be described and 
classified (semantically, formally and pragmatically) on a functional 
basis.  
As for the first statement, it is important to point out that the 
existence of politeness formulae is conceived of as not being restricted to 
their actual occurrence in natural speech, nor to the actual polite intention 
of the speaker or the hearer’s interpretation as polite. It is assumed, on the 
contrary, that politeness formulae exist independently of concrete 
contexts.  
If it is true that polite linguistic formulae transmit polite meanings 
independently of concrete contexts, they must consist of specific 
linguistic means1 that indicate their polite content. It is undisputed that 
linguistic politeness has something to do with recurring, conventionalized 
linguistic elements. If this were not the case, interlocutors would have a 
hard time meeting with their everyday (polite) linguistic needs in 
recurring situations. Even more bothering, yet banal at first glance, is the 
fact that if linguistic politeness were not formulaic, interlocutors would 
have no possibility to conventionally implicate and communicate their 
polite intentions.  
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If the linguistic expression of politeness is – at least to a consi-
derable extent – not restricted to particular realisations within a concrete 
communicative event, one should ask what kinds of linguistic means are 
used to express politeness. Indeed, one will find that some linguistic 
means are more likely to occur as instantiations of polite meanings than 
others. Conventionalized realisations of linguistic politeness will be 
called politeness formulae. But how can we distinguish an idiomatic 
expression from a polite idiomatic expression, i.e. a politeness formula? 
In other words, what is it that makes a linguistic formula a politeness 
formula? Linguistic politeness theory hardly ever raises this question 
explicitly and awards it due attention.  
To fill this gap, it will be necessary to find a way of systema-
tically describing politeness formulae on semantic, formal and pragmatic 
grounds. It is argued here that this can be achieved on the basis of the 
function of politeness. As will be shown later, one of the major functions 
of politeness is the establishment, maintenance, and negotiation of social 
distance relations.  
Before addressing the assumptions made above in more detail, it 
is worthwhile discussing the best known linguistic politeness theories in 
regard to their handling of the issues raised here. 
 
 
1. The normative or traditional approach2 
What is referred to here as the normative approach very often does not 
play a major role in overviews of linguistic politeness theories. The 
reason for this neglect is partly due to the fact that the normative view 
stands for a rather old-fashioned concept of politeness, namely that 
politeness is a set of socially stipulated, culture-specific norms of 
behaviour. However, the idea that politeness is a system of con-
ventionally determined norms is intuitively plausible and based on an un-
scientific, lay concept of politeness. As the normative approach considers 
politeness formulae to be the linguistic implementation of social rules, 
the existence of politeness formulae is taken for granted and neither 
questioned nor explicitly asserted. Norms of social behavior are simply 
assumed to result in a certain set of recurring linguistic means (i.e. 
politeness formulae) to implement those norms. That is the reason why 
Held (2005 [1992]: 136) refers to this viewpoint as “causal-determi-
nistic”. Werkhofer (2005 [1992]: 157) calls this notion of politeness the 
“traditional view“, Fraser (1990) describes the characteristics of the 
“social norm view“ as follows: “Briefly stated, it [the social norm view, 
KS] assumes that each society has a particular set of social norms 
consisting of more or less explicit rules that prescribe a certain behavior 
[…]“ (Fraser 1990: 220). 
Although normative aspects should be essential to any theory of 
politeness, linguistic politeness research followed other paths that had 
been opened up by linguistic pragmatics in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
normative approach is usually held only implicitly by grammar books 
that deal with linguistic aspects of politeness within the subchapter of 
some grammatical category (e.g. the verbal modes or pronominal 
address). Although the normative concept is not linked to any particular 
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names and has produced no research tradition, it is important to mention 
it here. 
First, the traditional view most clearly establishes the link bet-
ween idiomaticity and politeness because it focuses on the social nature 
of politeness phenomena. As social norms are by nature shared collec-
tively (otherwise they would be only individual norms and could thus not 
be recognized as such by the community), they must inevitably be 
instantiated by recurring linguistic patterns. Politeness is, in the tra-
ditional view, anticipated by the interlocutors and most clearly associated 
with formality, appropriateness, “good” behaviour and other evaluative 
lay notions of politeness. Thus, the normative approach has no reason 
either to restrict linguistic politeness to manifestations in concrete con-
texts or to deny the existence of politeness formulae altogether. As al-
ready said, it rather takes politeness as a regular communicative goal and 
deals with it as a part of the connotative meaning of certain linguistic 
categories, such as verbal modes, tense, aspect, pronominal address, 
modal adverbs, particles, nominal derivations (e.g. diminutives), sentence 
types, formulaic expressions (e.g. greetings, expressions of gratitude), 
and the like. Its method can therefore be considered deductive: the 
normative approach towards politeness in language starts from the 
linguistic structure/device and ascribes a certain polite meaning to it. The 
problem with this procedure is that almost any of those devices can also 
be used in contexts in which politeness is not an issue at all. For example, 
it is not always polite to say please, to ask a question, to use the 
subjunctive or passive voice or, in Slavonic languages, to employ the 
perfective aspect.   
 
 
2. The pragmatic approach 
The term pragmatic approach3 refers to the first linguistic theories of 
politeness that developed on the grounds of Speech Act Theory (Austin 
1962) and the Theory of Implicature (Grice 1975). Austin’s view of 
speech as social action made it possible to integrate politeness pheno-
mena into linguistic pragmatics as an aspect of certain speech acts. 
Grice’s theory of Conversational Implicature gave rise to the idea that 
politeness should be described in terms of conversational maxims. In the 
following, a brief outline will be given of the central assumptions and the 
most important exponents of the pragmatic view4.  
The first to mention here is Robin Lakoff (19735, 1975, 1979), 
whose original aim was to establish pragmatic rules that would operate 
alongside the syntactic rules postulated by generative linguistics. She did 
so by juxtaposing a politeness principle to the Gricean maxims, arguing 
that in most cases in which the Gricean maxims were violated, this was 
done in order to abide by the maxim of politeness. As Lakoff is not 
aiming at conducting empirical research but at formulating a theory 
that can account for the violation of the Gricean maxims and that will 
identify pragmatic rules of competence, it is self-evident that she does 
not engage in providing terminological and methodological tools for 
investigating given instances of speech in regard to the occurrence and 
make-up of politeness devices. She does, however, at least implicitly 
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assume that there must be certain linguistic means by which the three 
rules can be accounted for in verbal communication, for otherwise the 
maxim of politeness could not be implemented through language. 
Geoffrey Leech’s approach (1977, 1980, 1983) is somewhat more 
sophisticated and embedded in a general theory of pragmatics. Like 
Lakoff, Leech (1983) assumes a politeness principle operating alongside 
Grice’s cooperation principle and consisting of several politeness 
maxims. What is essential in Leech’s concept is the assumption that 
degrees of politeness can be measured by value scales, such as, for 
instance, an indirectness scale, a cost-benefit scale and a social distance 
scale. Politeness appears thus to be a gradable characteristic of certain 
types of speech acts.   
The most famous and most frequently applied approach to 
linguistic politeness is indisputably Brown and Levinson’s (1978, 1987) 
face-theory. Like Lakoff and Leech, Brown and Levinson start from the 
assumption that Grice’s theory is basically right and view politeness as a 
major reason for deviation from the conversational maxims. Face is seen 
as a twofold aspect of human identity, namely positive and negative face: 
positive face refers to the fact that individuals need to be integrated and 
accepted by the community, negative face relates to the individual’s 
wants that her/his actions be unimpeded by the community (cf. Brown 
and Levinson [1987: 129]). Brown and Levinson regard human inter-
action as potentially face-threatening – and politeness as a means to 
reduce that threat. Although their original model includes five different 
politeness strategies, it is the twofold typology of positive and negative 
politeness that has proved most fruitful. Positive politeness refers to the 
politeness efforts that are directed at the interlocutor’s positive face 
wants; negative politeness is in return paid to the negative face of the 
interactants. The importance of the distinction between positive and 
negative politeness for linguistic politeness theory will be discussed in 
more detail in Section 4. 
As regards the issues addressed in this paper, the pragmatic 
theories are characterized by a rather uncritical and unconscious attitude. 
The authors usually give examples and/or compilations of allegedly 
polite communicative strategies and rank them as more or less polite. 
This proceeding betrays the fact that the pragmatic approaches implicitly 
assume the existence of context-independent polite meanings. However, 
this attitude is not overtly discussed and remains restricted to the idea of 
politeness strategies which are heterogeneously implemented by certain 
stylistic devices, different communicative genres, kinds of speech acts, 
use of certain linguistic forms, etc. Accordingly, the second issue, the 
question of how politeness formulae are structured, is not addressed at 
all. As the notion of “politeness strategies” remains rather unspecified 
and is inconsistently applied both to speakers’ communicative strategies 
(e.g. be indirect) and to the linguistic means by which these strategies can 
be implemented (e.g. use downgraders), the pragmatic approaches do not 
distinguish appropriately between those two things and consequently do 
not focus on the relationship between them.  
In sum, one can say that the normative and pragmatic approach 
start from opposite points, but come up with the same result. The nor-
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mative approach starts from the linguistic means and attributes polite 
meanings to them. The pragmatic approach, on the contrary, departs from 
abstract speaker’s strategies of politeness and attributes certain linguistic 
means to them. Both trains of thought result in the assumption (be it 
explicit or implicit) that phenomena of linguistic politeness can be 
described context-independently and that linguistic politeness is shaped 
by specific linguistic means. It is claimed here that both assumptions are 
essentially correct. The normative and pragmatic approaches’ mistake 
lies in the fact that they are not concious of their assumptions, which 
makes them blind to the consequences thereof. As already pointed out 
above, both the normative and pragmatic view fail to explain why any of 
their allegedly polite means can also be employed for completely 
different communicative purposes6. Accordingly, they fail to establish a 
stringent notion of politeness formulae and to develop a theoretical 
framework to analyse them systematically. 
 
 
3. The post-pragmatic approach 
Post-pragmatic theory on linguistic politeness is most prominently 
represented by Richard J. Watts (e.g. 2004 [2003], 2005), other adherents 
are Sara Mills (2003) and Miriam Locher (2004; Locher and Watts 
2005). It is characterized by its dynamic view of politeness, thus 
emphasizing the fact that politeness is not only anticipated ex ante 
(normative view) or only inferred ex post (pragmatic view), but also 
negotiated in situ by both speaker and hearer. The dynamic notion of 
politeness in the post-pragmatic model is clearly opposed to the rather 
static norm- and strategy-based concepts of politeness. It is due to the 
discursive and disputable nature of politeness that post-pragmatic 
theorizing has come to the conclusion that linguistic structures are not 
and cannot be polite in themselves. In other words, politeness formulae 
do not exist. This attitude is clearly reflected in the fact that Watts (2004 
[2003]) only refers to the existence of conventionalized linguistic patterns 
as “expressions of procedural meaning” (2004 [2003]: 180) which are 
“open to the attribution of politeness7” (2004 [2003]: 217). The politeness 
of linguistic structures is, on the contrary, conceived of as a potential 
interpretation of the hearer; polite meanings are, in other words, 
dependent on the evaluation of interlocutors in certain and singular 
speech events. While this assumption may be suitable on the grounds of a 
general theory of social practice, it is unsatisfying in linguistic terms. 
This is so because it fails to establish categories by which incidences of 
linguistic politeness can be investigated. By reducing politeness to the 
realm of concrete and, therefore, varying contexts, it becomes impossible 
to do linguistic politeness research on a meso- or macro-level of analysis 
(Terkourafi 20058). From the post-pragmatic point of view, politeness 
phenomena can be described linguistically only in terms of conversation 
analysis, which is, by definition, a micro-level approach. Although it is 
both necessary and highly promising to investigate the discursive 
construction and negotiation of polite meanings in authentic commu-
nication, the discursive approach of post-pragmatic theory leaves 
linguistic politeness researchers who want to make assumptions about the 
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systematics of linguistic politeness practically empty-handed: as polite-
ness is designed as a possible aspect of concrete utterances, it becomes 
nearly impossible to establish linguistically based intercultural com-
parisons of politeness standards. It is, by the way, due to this lack of 
macro-level applicability that empirical politeness research is still do-
minated by pragmatic theory, especially by the framework of Brown and 
Levinson. 
The post-pragmatic view has, however, still one big advantage 
over the other politeness theories. It has succeeded in overcoming a great 
theoretical problem of politeness theory, namely the antithesis between 
social and individual aspects of politeness. While the other approaches 
had been focusing on either the social-prescriptive (normative view) or 
the individual-creative (pragmatic view) aspect of politeness, post-prag-
matic theory holds that politeness actually mediates between the social 
and the individual, i.e. that it is a means of organizing, maintaining and 
negotiating interpersonal relationships. It will be shown below that it is 
on the basis of this function of politeness that a systematic analysis of 
linguistic politeness can be established.  
 
 
4. The function of politeness 
All three approaches ignore the question of what makes a linguistic 
formula a politeness formula: the normative and pragmatic approaches do 
not recognize the importance of the question but simply take the polite 
meanings of “polite linguistic means” or, respectively, “politeness 
strategies”, as a given. The post-pragmatic approach, on the other hand, 
deals with the problem but comes to the disputable conclusion that there 
is actually no link between linguistic means and the polite meanings they 
are attached to in actual speech. Consequently, any linguistic device can 
– under particular circumstances – be considered polite, which means that 
there is no way to make general assumptions about the structure and 
make-up of politeness devices in a given language. That, again, results in 
the denial of the existence of politeness formulae altogether.  
Let us now try to refute the Wittgensteinian notion of the absolute 
context relativity of polite meanings. Although it is widely accepted that 
contexts plays a decisive role in the assessment of linguistic politeness 
phenomena, native speakers of a given language usually find it quite easy 
to classify sentences according to their degree of politeness without 
asking for any further contextual information9. Furthermore, it is highly 
plausible that an utterance like “could I have some water, please” is 
usually considered more polite than “give me some water”. It has been 
argued by the opponents of the non-contextual approach that there can be 
found (or rather, invented) contexts in which “could I have some water, 
please” is not interpreted or/and intended as polite. For example, a person 
P could utter this sentence in a situation where it will be interpreted as 
rather impolite, e.g. when her/his interlocutor is highly busy (obviously 
too busy to comply to P’s request) or in a higher-ranking position (and 
therefore expects P to get her/his water herself/himself). Or else, it could 
be that P simply utters the sentence with an unfriendly, maybe even 
angry intonation (maybe because s/he has already asked a number of 
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times). Of course, all of these circumstances may well occur in natural 
communication. However, they are specific and rather improbable10. In 
the same vein, the post-pragmatic approach argues that expressions of 
rudeness can appear to be non-rude in certain situations, e.g. among close 
friends. Still those instantiations of fake-rudeness would hardly be 
attached the label “polite” by any of the interlocutors. 
To resolve this problem, theorists who support the idea of 
contextual independence of polite meanings have introduced the notion 
of abstract context (Escandell-Vidal 1996: 643). Abstract contexts are 
grounded in the individual’s experience and knowledge of how a given 
situation is usually dealt with. In cases where further contextual 
information is absent, individuals tend to interpret the situation as a 
default situation in which the given utterance is stereotypically produced. 
This proceeding is plausible and apt to account for the empirical finding 
that individuals are capable of ranking statements according to the degree 
of politeness without any detailed contextual information. 
However, the concept of default contexts could be correct even if 
politeness formulae were politeness formulae simply because of conven-
tion. Regardless of the structural make-up of politeness devices, the 
speakers of a given language would simply learn and thus know that 
certain linguistic patterns are usually to be interpreted as polite in a ste-
reotypical situation.  
If this were the case, there would be no basis (nor a real reason) 
to investigate the formal and semantic characteristics of linguistic 
politeness devices and the relationship between those two dimensions 
and pragmatic variables. However, the range of linguistic means that are 
– even across languages – associated with the expression of politeness 
does not seem to be completely random and merely conventional. On the 
contrary, it seems that some linguistic means are more likely to perform 
politeness duties than others. While it is less questionable that politeness 
formulae are motivated semantically (for example, the salutation goodbye 
goes back to God be with you, in which the semantic motivation was still 
manifest) and pragmatically (by the situation in which they occur), the 
motivation for the use of certain linguistic forms is somewhat less 
obvious. It is exactly this threefold motivation of politeness formulae that 
linguistic politeness should engage in because it promises to provide 
insights into the interrelation of extra-linguistic, cultural motivations and 
linguistic, structural motivations of linguistic politeness phenomena. 
Such an analysis could eventually lead to conclusions about potential uni-
versalities in linguistic politeness. 
To my knowledge, the only theory of linguistic politeness to 
really focus on the problem of the interrelation between polite contents 
and politeness structures was formulated by Ehrhardt (2002). Ehrhardt 
discusses normative and pragmatic theories and argues that they both 
implicitly assume a relationship between linguistic forms and polite 
contents. Although in his view this is essentially correct, he holds that 
both accounts fail to explicitly investigate that relationship by asking the 
question of why some linguistic forms are more likely to be used for 
politeness matters than others. After examining some phenomena that are 
of a traditional interest to politeness studies such as pronominal address, 
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verbal modes, tenses and particles, he concludes that the reason why 
those means are an essential part of politeness studies is to be found in 
both their literal meaning (which is metaphorically extended for 
politeness purposes) and in the concrete contexts in which they occur 
(Ehrhardt 2002: 198). He thus tries to reconcile the contextual and the 
non-contextual approach.  
Ehrhardt (2002: 221) also introduces the notion of ‘Höflichkeits-
indikator’ (‘politeness indicator‘). Politeness indicators are the formal 
linguistic means that constitute politeness formulae. It is important to 
note that politeness indicators are linguistic categories (grammatical 
categories, for example) that can be part of politeness formulae. 
However, politeness indicators may in other circumstances just as well be 
ordinary expressions of tense, mode, other modal meanings, etc., or serve 
other communicative purposes than politeness (the expression of real 
uncertainty, anger, affection, and the like). In cognitivist and functionalist 
terms, this view can be illustrated by the notion of radial categories, i.e. 
categories that consist of a rather stable centre with fuzzy boundaries on 
their periphery. In most cases, the polite aspect of the category will be 
centred towards the periphery, while in some cases it may even be 
considered the very core of it (consider, for instance, the particle please, 
which stereotypically functions as a politeness particle).    
As Ehrhardt’s approach is basically theoretical, he does not 
engage in developing a tool for empirical studies of linguistic politeness. 
He does nevertheless give us a few hints of how such a tool could be 
conceived by pointing out the major function of politeness as a means of 
conducting cooperative relational work11. Ehrhardt (2002: 237) even 
notes that the only valid basis for investigating linguistic politeness 
phenomena lies in that common function.  
To exploit the notion of relational work in politeness research 
fruitfully, it is necessary to identify the role that politeness performs in 
relational work in more detail. As will be shown in the next section, 
politeness research has already provided an answer to this question.  
In linguistic theorizing on politeness, the idea that politeness has 
the function of regulating interpersonal relations actually is not new. 
However, before the emergence of the post-pragmatic theories (among 
which we can now count Ehrhardt’s contribution, too) the central 
function of politeness was usually only hinted at more or less obviously. 
According to Ehrhardt (2002: 237), it is argued here that politeness 
phenomena can only be described on the basis of that function as this 
seems to be their only common denominator. That is why it is promising 
to take a closer look at that function. 
First of all, it needs to be pointed out that the kind of relational 
work that politeness engages in is essentially social, i.e. that politeness 
operates on the level of social relations (not or at least to a greatly lesser 
extent, for example, in intimate ones, where other and less regulated 
pragmatic parameters than politeness come into play). This aspect is 
neglected even by the post-pragmatic approaches to politeness. The 
relational work performed by politeness devices can thus also be referred 
to as the regulation of relations of social distance. This is, however, a 
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metaphor, as distance in politeness formulae can be conceived of only in 
a non-literal sense. 
Reading through both older and more recent contributions to 
linguistic politeness theory, we find that thoughts about the distancing 
function of politeness are almost omnipresent. For a start, consider 
Brown and Levinson’s distinction between positive and negative 
politeness. The two terms actually refer to the function of politeness 
either to overcome (positive politeness) or to establish or maintain 
(negative politeness) social distance. The fact that it was those two of 
Brown and Levinson’s original five types of politeness strategies that 
earned most attention is probably not accidental. There are a number of 
dual typologies that can be interpreted analogously to Brown’s and 
Levinson’s: Scollon and Scollon (1981) refer to “strategies of in-
volvement and independence”, Rathmayr (1996) introduces the 
distinction between “Solidaritäts- und Distanzhöflichkeit” (“politeness of 
solidarity” and “politeness of distance”), Ehlich (2005: 82-89) talks about 
the metaphorical use of kinship terms to overcome social distance. In 
House (2005: 18), the distinction between two basic human needs, 
namely “coming together” versus “noli me tangere” can be found. 
Nekvapil and Neustupný state that 
 
The central theme of politeness is how sociocultural distance between 
interactants is reflected in communication and how it is shaped by it. 
(Nekvapil and Neustupný 2005: 247-248) 
But even before Brown and Levinson, the presence of the 
distance metaphor is striking. Brown and Gilman (1960) introduce a 
duality of “power and solidarity” in their famous study on pronominal 
address. And Lakoff’s (1973) rules of politeness can be interpreted in the 
same vein as well: The rules don’t impose and give options can be seen as 
payment to negative face wants, be friendly considers positive ones.  
It is now necessary to focus on the notion of metaphor. For a real 
metaphor it is essential that relations are not only transferred from one 
dimension of experience to another (in our case, spatial relations are used 
to characterize social relations), but that new meanings are attached to 
those relations. In our case, it seems plausible that distance and closeness 
are attached to certain value systems, and that those values are culture-
specific. Insights of modern cognitive linguistics help us understand the 
process of attaching meaning to metaphors12. Distance can most plausibly 
be associated with difference, for things at a distance are very often 
different from us (or, at least, not accessible to our senses to be figured 
out as different or similar and therefore conceived of as different rather 
than similar). In a second step, distance/difference may be associated 
with strangeness and unfamiliarity. Analogously, closeness is in our 
world linked to similarity and familiarity. The illustration of social rela-
tions as a spatially motivated metaphor makes it possible to understand 
why both positive and negative values can be attached to both distancing 
and proximity devices in different cultures. The classification of cultures 
according to their favoring distance or closeness is exactly what has been 
done in a lot of empirical and comparative intercultural studies on 
10 
 
politeness (e.g. Sifianou 1992; Pavlidou 1994; Wierzbicka 1985; Rath-
mayr 1996a, 1996b; Schlund 2009).    
The above statements have served to establish the regulation of 
social distance relations as a central function of politeness. By referring 
to the concept of metaphor, it has been argued that the major function of 
politeness, i.e. the regulation of social relationships, was to be interpreted 
as a means of establishing closeness and distance between individuals. 
Both closeness and distance are culturally determined concepts that are 
associated with certain, but different, culture-specific positive and 
negative values. Closeness, as associated with similarity and familiarity, 
can thus be loaded with positive connotations in one culture (e.g. 
intimacy, sincerity) while another culture most positively values distance 
as a way of accounting for individuality and variety. It can further be 
assumed that the distancing preferences of a given culture will be re-
flected in the pragmatic, semantic and formal make-up of the linguistic 
politeness devices that this culture produces. To test this assumption, it 
will be necessary to find a method of analysis that will enable us to 
determine whether a given linguistic means is to be classified as a device 
of distance or closeness. 
One further remark needs to be made about distance. While there 
is naturally only one dimension of closeness, two dimensions of distance 
are possible. Horizontal distance refers to the distance relation between 
equal interlocutors, vertical distance, on the other hand, refers to 
hierarchical social relations. Although not made in all the politeness 
theories mentioned above, this is a very important point. Lakoff (1975), 
for instance, accounts for this fact with her threefold typology of 
camaraderie, distance and deference cultures.   
After showing that the distinction between politeness of closeness 
and politeness of distance is well-motivated and justified, we can now 
pass to the question of what the functionalist method of analysis 
proposed here could be like.  
 
 
5. Functional analysis of politeness formulae 
Before demonstrating the functional analysis advocated here, we need to 
focus on the notion of politeness formula. Up to now, the term has been 
used without any further explanation in this article, the assumption being 
that the reader has a common sense understanding of the word that is 
sufficient to follow the lines of argumentation.  
As has already been pointed out, the expression of linguistic 
politeness is to a great extent linked to idiomaticity and convention. This 
is even more the case on the macro-level of analysis, on which, by 
definition, only idiomatic and conventionalized elements (i.e., recurring 
elements) can be accounted for. All formulaic expressions which are 
stereotypically used as a means to conduct social relational work co-
operatively can be called politeness formulae13. A politeness formula can 
be fully formulaic or only semi-formulaic14, and it can consist of one 
single world or a whole sentence (examples will be given later on in this 
section). Any other linguistic means that will not stereotypically, but only 
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occasionally be used as a politeness device on a meso- or micro-level of 
analysis will be referred to as a politeness form. 
A further comment needs to be made on the link between 
politeness formulae and politeness indicators. Politeness formulae are 
(often, not always) made up of politeness indicators, i.e. linguistic means 
that are suited to indicate polite meanings. As a major function of 
politeness is to reflect relations of social distance, it is argued that 
politeness indicators (and, consequently, politeness formulae) can be 
classified according to their metaphorical distancing or nearing potential. 
The metaphorical potential of politeness formulae can be examined in 
three dimensions: the formal, semantic and pragmatic dimensions. The 
pragmatic dimension asks for the circumstances under which a politeness 
formula is usually employed. In the case of apologies, it is important to 
ask in which situations a culture expects the apologizing formula to 
occur. Pragmatic variables such as the degree of norm-violation that 
preceded the apology, the hierarchy between the interlocutors, etc., have 
to be considered here to interpret the pragmatic factor in regard to its 
distancing or nearing potential. The semantic dimension is concerned 
with the semantics of the formula, even if they have been obscured by 
processes of pragmaticalisation. The German requesting formula bitte 
(‘please’) has developed from ich bitte dich/Sie (literally: ‘I am begging 
you’), which can be interpreted as a means of deference, thus originally 
metaphorizing vertical distance. The most interesting, and probably 
mostly disputed, dimension of analysis is the formal dimension. In 
accordance with Ehrhardt (2002), it is assumed here that some linguistic 
forms are more suitable to indicate politeness than others. The relation 
assumed between the content and form of politeness formulae is thus one 
of iconicity: distancing devices will reflect distance on a formal level, 
and nearing devices will reflect closeness on a formal level, respectively. 
The stereotype semi-formulaic politeness formula to utter a request in a 
service encounter is ‘I would like’ + direct object. This formula consists 
of two formal politeness indicators, namely the verbal mode subjunctive 
and the sentence focus on ego (and not, as in other languages in 
comparable situations, on alter). Both indicators can in our model be 
interpreted as distancing devices. The following table was designed to 






formal semantic pragmatic 
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means are used?  
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content of the 
constituents of the 
PF?  
In which situations 
does the PF occur? 




It may occur that for a given politeness formula, it is not pro-
mising to conduct the analysis on all three levels. In the case of one-word 
formulae, formal analysis may be unfruitful; in the case of fully 
pragmaticalized formulae a semantic analysis seems less promising. 
However, if the assumptions made above are correct, functional analysis 





6. Conclusion: what the functional perspective can add to theory and 
empirical research  
The aim of this contribution was not to introduce another theory of 
linguistic politeness but to add a new perspective to the already existing 
theories. It was argued that the major function of politeness existed in the 
maintenance and regulation of social distance, an account consistent not 
only with post-pragmatic but also with pragmatic theorizing. To justify 
this view, the metaphorical motivation of social distance was discussed, 
showing that distance relations are metaphorically attached to cultural 
values and that linguistic politeness reflects those values. In a second line 
of thought, it was argued that politeness research should not be reduced 
to studies of singular incidents of natural speech but that politeness 
should be accounted for on a macro-level of analysis first, with politeness 
formulae being the main category of analysis. The notion of the absolute 
context relativity of linguistic politeness was thus replaced by the notion 
of abstract contexts (Escandell-Vidal 1996). It was then argued that the 
make-up of politeness formulae was motivated functionally, i.e. by the 
distancing function that was assumed to be central for politeness in the 
first place. The functional motivation was expected to be traceable not 
only on the pragmatic and semantic, but also on the formal level of 
analysis. The inclusion of the formal level was of major importance as it 
is shown on this level that linguistic means that constitute politeness 
formulae are not arbitrary but motivated. E.g., the passive voice can be 
functionalized for politeness purposes because it is a means of changing 
the focus of an utterance; verbal modes, adverbial modifiers and particles 
can be functionalized because they seemingly transfer the proposition of 
an utterance into the realm of potentiality; the perfective verbal aspect (in 
Slavonic languages) focuses on the semelfactive nature of an action, etc. 
It is basically on the formal level that the question of why some linguistic 
structures seem to be more closely attached to politeness than others can 
be answered15.  
The method advocated here is probably not the only way to 
describe PF systematically. However, an advantage of the functional 
account lies in the fact that it aims at including all kinds of phenomena 
associated with linguistic politeness research (e.g., forms of address, 
greetings, apologies, requests) that are usually treated separately in 
linguistic politeness research. Second, the functional perspective is not 
merely descriptive. By linking the pragmatic, semantic and formal make-
up of politeness devices with cultural value systems, an explanative 
aspect is added to the description. The contribution that studies on 
linguistic politeness can make to the vast field of cultural studies thus 
becomes even more manifest. Finally, the functional perspective allows 
for an explanation of why the formal make-up of politeness formulae is 
dominated by (usually the marked member of) certain categories while 
others do not play a stereotypical role here. Although not “polite in 
themselves”, those linguistic categories add to the “politeness default 
value” (Escandell-Vidal 1996: 643) ascribed to the politeness formulae 
13 
 
that they are a part of. As such, they must be acknowledged the status of 





1The word means is used here in a most general sense, referring to semantic, formal 
and pragmatic aspects of the linguistic inventory. 
2
 The labels given to the different approaches to linguistic politeness here must not 
be confused with the labels given elsewhere. For instance, Terkourafi (2005) does 
not discuss what is called the normative or traditional approach here, but refers to 
the Gricean paradigm as “traditional” instead. The Gricean accounts, however, are 
here referred to as “pragmatic accounts”.  
3
 Remember that the pragmatic approach corresponds to the “traditional view” in 
Terkourafi’s terms (2005).  
4
 The interested reader is referred to one of the numerous overviews of the different 
streams of thought in linguistic politeness theory. A succinct, yet highly informative 
survey of both the pragmatic (traditional) and the post-pragmatic (modern) view of 
politeness can be found in Terkourafi (2005). For other overviews consult Fraser 
(1990); Held (2005 [1992]); Watts (2004: 47-116, 2005: xi-xlvii). 
5
 As Grice’s ideas had been known in linguistic circles since the end of the 1960ies, 
Lakoff could base her thoughts on Grice as early as 1973, well before the official 
publication of his article in 1975 (cf. Watts 2005: xxxiv). 
6
 The discussion betrays once again the western ethnocentricity of politeness theory. 
Of course there are some languages in which politeness matters actually are 
grammaticalized (e.g. Japenese). As those languages are not European, they tend to 
be ignored by western mainstream research. Nevertheless, it holds for the languages 
of the western hemisphere that politeness is not a grammaticalized category and that, 
even in languages where it is, a lot about politeness remains open to concrete 
intentions and interpretations. 
7
 In the original, Watts talks about “politeness1”, by which he means lay inter-
pretations of politeness.  
8
 While Terkourafi (2005) holds that approaches to politeness on any level of 
granularity (i.e. macro-, meso- and micro-level) are equal, I assume a hierarchic 
order between the three levels. As the macro-level analysis serves as the basis for 
the lower levels, it must be considered superordinate to them.  
9
 A survey on linguistic politeness in Serbian and German, carried out among 
German and Serbian native speakers, supports this assumption: all of the 120 
participants addressed the question in which they were asked to rank propositionally 
identical sentences with regard to their degree of politeness and did not seem to have 
any particular difficulties with their task (cf. Schlund 2009: 92-101). 
10
 A special point has to be made about irony. Irony states, by definition, the 
contrary of the speaker’s actual intention. As such, the ironic use of linguistic means 
could serve as a counter-example for anything and can thus not be offered as 
evidence of the contextual approach to politeness, either.   
11
 To my knowledge, Ehrhardt (2002) actually was the first to conceive of politeness 
as a medium of relational work. Watts, who is usually considered the creator of the 
concept, developed his view one year later. The reason why Ehrhardt’s contribution 
did not receive wide attention in international linguistic politeness research is 
probably due to the fact that he published only one monograph on the topic, and that 
the language of the monograph is German. The fact that two researchers formulated 
two very similar theories of politeness independently of each other even increases 
the plausibility of their concept.    
12
 For further information on the cognitive linguistic framework cf. Janda (2006).   
13
 Of course, address forms also belong to the realm of politeness formulae as they 






 The similarity to Watt’s (2003: 186-200) distinction between formulaic and semi-
formulaic expressions of procedural meaning is obvious. The differences between 
the two kinds of politeness formulae and the two kinds of expressions of procedural 
meanings are that politeness formulae exist independently of their actual use in 
natural speech, and, consequently, that it is possible to compile an inventory of the 
most current politeness formulae of a given language. 
15
 It is worth noting here that it is usually the marked member of a category that is 
assigned a “polite potential” (e.g. past and future tenses, passive voice, modes other 
than indicative, perfective aspect). This is probably due to the characteristic of 
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